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Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and
uncertain local monitoring
Francesco Nava
Economics Department, London School of Economics
Michele Piccione
Economics Department, London School of Economics
This paper discusses community enforcement in infinitely repeated, two-action
games with local interaction and uncertain monitoring. Each player interacts with
and observes only a fixed set of opponents, of whom he is privately informed. The
main result shows that when beliefs about the monitoring structure have full sup-
port, efficiency can be sustained with sequential equilibria that are independent
of the players’ beliefs. Stronger results are obtained when only acyclic monitoring
structures are allowed or players have unit discount rates. These equilibria satisfy
numerous robustness properties.
Keywords. Local monitoring, repeated games, cooperation, networks.
JEL classification. C72, C73, D85.
1. Introduction
In many strategic environments, interaction is local and segmented. Competing neigh-
borhood stores by and large serve different yet overlapping sets of customers, the behav-
ior of the residents of an apartment block affects their contiguous neighbors to a larger
extent than neighbors in a different block, a nation’s foreign or domestic policy typically
generates larger externalities for neighboring nations than for remote ones. One classic
case is the private provision of local public goods in which the strategic interaction is
modelled using either a prisoner’s dilemma or a hawk–dove game. For example, many
forms of antisocial behavior are generally captured by the former, whereas investments
in common security, infrastructure, or maintenance that yield benefits only when a fixed
cutoff level is reached are captured by the latter. In addition to local interaction, one no-
table feature of these environments is uncertain monitoring: whereas participants are
aware of their own neighbors’ identities and actions, they are not necessarily aware of
the identity and actions of their neighbors’ neighbors.
Within these strategic environments, it is of particular interest to study long run in-
teraction, when incentives can only be provided locally in a decentralized manner. Our
objective is to analyze such interaction within a repeated game framework that differs
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from the standard one by allowing actions to be observed only locally. Such a framework,
despite its plainness and its potential applications, has not yet produced significant re-
sults in the literature. A natural question that we address is whether local community
enforcement suffices to generate efficient behavior. The main obstacle to sustaining co-
operation is that information about individuals’ past behavior in a relationship is local:
it is common knowledge within the relationship, but is not necessarily available to out-
siders. The absence of publicly observable histories implies that punishments are no
longer based on “simultaneous” coordination: by punishing a neighbor’s deviation, a
player can trigger subsequent punishments from different neighbors, who were not re-
lated to the original defector and were thus unable to observe the initial deviation. Thus,
if a shop ceases to collude so as to punish defections by a neighboring competitor, it will
affect the behavior of other neighboring shops that were not affected by the first defec-
tion. Moreover, as such defections spread through neighborhoods, they might return to
one of the players who was either a source of such defection or had retaliated to it, and
enter cycles. Naturally, in these circumstances, the construction of equilibrium incen-
tives for cooperative behavior and the derivation of equilibrium beliefs is a challenging
task.
1.1 Summary
We study infinitely repeated two-action games. The setup consists of a finite number
of players who choose in every period whether to cooperate or to defect. A graph that
represents the monitoring structure—the information network—is realized at the be-
ginning of the game. Each player is privately informed of his neighborhood, namely
the subset of players with whom he will interact in bilateral relationships for an infi-
nite number of periods, but receives no information as to other players’ neighborhoods.
A player observes only the actions played by his neighbors and, crucially, cannot dis-
criminate among them by choosing different actions. That is, in every period, a player
chooses one action that applies to all bilateral relationships in his neighborhood. All the
players play the same game in all neighborhoods.
We show that for sufficiently high discount rates and any beliefs with full support
about the monitoring structure, sequential equilibria exist in which the efficient stage-
game outcome is played in every period. Note that standard results do not apply be-
cause bilateral enforcement may not be incentive compatible when punishments in one
relationship affect outcomes in all the others. For instance, punishing a neighbor indef-
initely with a grim trigger strategy is not viable if cooperation in other relationships is
disrupted, and modifications as in Ellison (1994) work only for particular specifications
of payoffs. Indeed, equilibrium strategies are such that, after any history, players’ believe
that cooperation eventually resumes.
Our proofs are constructive and exploit simple bounded-punishment strategies that
are robust with respect to the players’ priors about the monitoring structure. In particu-
lar, in the equilibria characterized, only local information matters to determine players’
behavior. Efficiency is supported by strategies that respond to defections with further
defections. When the players’ discount rate is less than 1, the main difficulty in the con-
struction of sequentially rational strategies that support efficiency is the preservation of
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short-run incentive compatibility after some particular histories of play. When defec-
tions spread through a network, two complications arise. The first occurs when a player
expects future defection to come from a particular direction. Suppose that somewhere
in a cycle, for example, a defection occurs and reaches a player from one direction. If
this player does not respond, he may expect future defections from the opposite direc-
tion caused by players who are themselves responding to the original defection. This
player’s short-term incentives then depend on the timing and on the number of future
defections that he expects. In such cases, the verification of sequential rationality and
the calculation of consistent beliefs can be extremely demanding. We circumvent this
difficulty via the construction of consistent beliefs such that a player never expects fu-
ture defections to reach him. Such beliefs are generated trivially when priors assign pos-
itive probability only to acyclic monitoring structures. More importantly, as we shall
see, such beliefs can also be generated when priors have full support. The second com-
plication arises when a player fails to respond to a large number of defections. On the
one hand, matching the number of defections of the opponent in the future may not
be incentive compatible, say when this player is currently achieving efficient payoffs
with a large number of different neighbors. The restriction that a player’s action is com-
mon to all neighbors is, of course, the main source of complications here. On the other
hand, not matching them may give rise to the circumstances outlined in the first type
of complication, that is, this player may then expect future defections from a different
direction. The former hurdle is circumvented by bounding the length of punishments
and the latter, as before, by constructing appropriate consistent beliefs.
The above difficulties do not arise when players are patient, as short-term incen-
tives are irrelevant and punishments need not be bounded. Indeed, stronger results
are obtained for the case of limit discounting in which payoffs are evaluated according
to Banach–Mazur limits. We show that efficiency is resilient to histories of defections.
In particular, there exists a sequential equilibrium such that after any finite sequence
of defections, paths eventually converge to the constant play of efficient actions in all
neighborhoods in every future period. An essential part of the construction is that in
any relationship in which defections have occurred, the number of periods in which
the inefficient actions are played is “balanced”: as the game unfolds from any history,
both players will have played the inefficient action an equal number of times before re-
suming the efficient play. Remarkably, such balanced retaliations eventually extinguish
themselves and always allow the resumption of cooperation throughout the network.
Although our formal analysis is restricted to uniform discount rates and symmet-
ric stage games with deterministic payoffs, the equilibria characterized are robust with
respect to heterogeneity in payoffs and discount rates, and with respect to uncertainty
in payoffs and population size, as long as the ordinal properties of the stage games are
maintained across the players. The above equilibria obviously persist as babbling equi-
libria in setups with communication. In addition, these equilibria can be easily modi-
fied to accommodate monitoring structures in which players interact with fewer players
than they observe.
Section 2 presents the setup and defines the relevant equilibrium properties. Sec-
tion 3 considers games in which players are arbitrarily patient and proves the existence
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of cooperative equilibria. Such equilibria are shown to be independent of the players’
beliefs on the monitoring structure, and to satisfy a desirable notion of stability and sev-
eral other robustness properties. Section 4 considers games with impatient players and
shows how cooperation can be achieved when prior beliefs have full support. The first
part of the Appendix shows that results trivially extend to games in which only acyclic
monitoring structures are possible. All the proofs that are omitted from the main text
appear in the second part of the Appendix.
1.2 Related literature
This paper fits within the literature on community enforcement in repeated games.
A major strand pioneered by Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) focuses on environments
with random matching of players and shows that efficient allocations can be sustained
as equilibria when players become arbitrarily patient. Subsequent contributions in-
clude Takahashi (2010) and Deb (2012). In our model, matching is not random, but
determined at the beginning of the game and fixed throughout the play.
A large, growing literature investigates community enforcement in environments in
which players interact with and monitor different subsets of other players under a vari-
ety of different modelling assumptions. The advantage of our framework is that it does
not rely on neighbor-specific punishments, communication, or knowledge of the global
monitoring structure. Some notable studies allow players to choose neighbor-specific
actions, such as Ali and Miller (2013), Lippert and Spagnolo (2011), Mihm et al. (2009),
Fainmesser (2012), Jackson et al. (2012), and Fainmesser and Goldberg (2012), while
others restrict attention to environments in which the monitoring structure is common
knowledge and communication is possible, such as Ahn (1997), Vega-Redondo (2006),
and Kinateder (2009). The vast majority of these studies focuses on prisoner’s dilemma
type interactions.
Our framework is closely related to several works that, unlike our model, postulate
no uncertainty about the monitoring structure. Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996) es-
tablish a sequentially rational folk theorem for general stage-game payoffs when each
player is observed by at least two other players. and when public communication and
public randomization are allowed. Renault and Tomala (1998) establish a Nash folk the-
orem for special monitoring structures (in which the subgraphs obtained by suppress-
ing any one player are still connected), general stage-game payoffs, no discounting, and
no explicit communication. Haag and Lagunoff (2006) consider games with prisoner’s
dilemma interactions and heterogeneous discount rates, and show for which monitor-
ing structures cooperation can be sustained by local trigger strategies. Xue (2004) and
Cho (2011, 2013) also focus on the prisoner’s dilemma. Cho (2013) considers acycli-
cal networks and allows neighbors to communicate. Cho (2011) shows the existence of
sequential equilibria in which players cooperate in every period and in which coopera-
tion eventually resumes after deviations if public randomization is allowed. Xue (2004)
restricts the analysis to linear networks.
Wolitzky (2013) investigates a setup similar to ours with uncertainty about the moni-
toring structure and characterizes the maximal level of cooperation that can be enforced
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for fixed discount rates in a local public goods game with compact action sets. Unlike
our model, the monitoring structure changes every period and is learned at the end of
each period. This feature of the model plays an essential role in the equilibrium con-
struction and prevents any of his results from applying to our framework.
One significant point of departure of our paper from the above literature is the con-
struction of equilibrium strategies. In particular, reciprocity plays a crucial role in the
characterization of sequentially rational behavior. Our equilibria are somewhat evoca-
tive of the “trading favors” equilibria in Möbius (2001) and Hopenhayn and Hauser
(2008), despite the frameworks bearing little resemblance. Notably, our players can be
viewed as “trading” punishment off the equilibrium path.
2. Setup and equilibrium properties
We first introduce the setup and the information structure. Then we proceed to define
the solution concept and equilibrium properties.
2.1 The stage game
Consider a game—the stage game—played by a set N of n players in which any player i
interacts with a subset of players Ni ⊆N \ {i} of size ni, which we call the neighborhood
of player i. We assume that j ∈ Ni if and only if i ∈ Nj . This structure of interaction
defines an undirected graph (NG) in which ij ∈G if and only if j ∈Ni. We refer to G as
the information network. Define a path to be an m tuple of players (j1     jm) such that
jk+1 ∈ Njk , k = 12    m− 1. If jm = j1, a path is a cycle. Given a neighborhood Ni for
player i, let (Ni) be the set of information networks in which player i’s neighborhood
is Ni.
Players are privately informed about their neighborhood. The beliefs of player i re-
garding the information network, conditional on observing his neighborhood, are de-
rived from common prior beliefs f over the set of information networks.1 We say that
a prior f is admissible if, for any i ∈ N and M ⊆ N \ {i}, f (G) > 0 for some G for which
Ni =M . Admissibility ensures that posterior beliefs are well defined for any realization
of the information network. We assume throughout the paper that priors are admissible.
The set of admissible priors is denoted by A.
The set of actions of player i is Ai and it consists of only two actions labeled C and D.
We refer to action C as cooperation and to action D as defection. A player must choose
the same action for all his neighbors. That is, a player cannot discriminate across neigh-
bors and his action must be played in his entire neighborhood. Given a subset M of
players, let AM denote ×j∈MAj and let aM denote an element of AM . We often use −i
to denote N \ {i}. The payoff of any player is separable across relationships. Let ηij de-
fine the emphasis of player i in the relationship with player j. The stage-game payoff of
player i is
vi(ai aNi)=
∑
j∈Ni
ηijuij(ai aj)
1The assumption that priors are common is inessential.
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where uij(ai aj), the payoff of player i in the relationship ij ∈G, is given by
i \ j C D
C 1 −l
D 1+ g 0
For ease of notation, we assume that ηij > 0 for any ij in G. Note that if ηij = 0 for ij ∈G,
player i observes the actions of player j but his payoff is not affected. All our results
extend to the case in which some ηij ’s are equal to zero for ij ∈G.
We adopt the convention that payoffs are equal to zero when Ni is empty. For
simplicity, the above payoff matrix is common to all bilateral relationships. We clarify
throughout the analysis when this assumption can be dispensed with.
We restrict attention to stage-games payoffs for which mutual cooperation is effi-
cient. We also assume that defection is a best response when the opponent cooper-
ates to rule out the trivial case in which mutual cooperation is an equilibrium of the
stage game. Such restrictions amount to the following assumption, which is maintained
throughout.
Assumption A1. Payoffs satisfy g− l < 1, g > 0.
Payoffs are common knowledge. After the main results, we discuss the extent to
which this assumption is necessary. Naturally, if l > 0, the stage game has a unique
Bayes Nash equilibrium in which all players play D. If instead l < 0, the stage game
always possesses a mixed strategy Bayes Nash equilibrium.2
2.2 The repetition
The players play the infinite repetition of the stage game. The information network is
realized prior to the beginning of play and remains constant thereafter. In every period,
a player observes only the past play of his neighbors. The set of possible histories for
player i ∈N whose realized neighborhood is Ni is defined as
HiNi = {∅} ∪
{ ∞⋃
t=1
[×ts=1ANi∪{i}]
}

where ∅ denotes the empty history. An interim strategy for player i with neighborhood
Ni is a function σiNi that assigns to each history in HiNi an action in {CD}. The set of
interim strategies of player i is iNi . A strategy σi of player i is a collection of interim
strategies {σiM}M⊂N\{i}.
2When l < 0, pure strategy equilibria also exist in some networks, as choosing actions different than
their neighbors’ can be a player’s best reply. In particular, if beliefs are concentrated on networks with
cycles of even length, pure equilibria exist, since players can successfully miscoordinate actions with all
their neighbors.
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Players discount the future with a common factor δ ≤ 1. To define the payoffs
of the infinitely repeated game, fix a network G. Given a profile of strategies σN =
(σ1σ2    σn), let {atN }∞t=0 be the sequence of stage-game actions generated by σN
when the information network is G and let {vi(ati atNi)}∞t=1 be the sequence of stage-
game utilities of player i. Define
wti(σN |G)=
t∑
s=1
vi(a
s
i  a
s
Ni
)
t
to be the average payoff up to period t and define wi(σN |G) = {wti(σN |G)}∞t=1 to be the
sequence of average payoffs. Repeated game payoffs conditional on network G are de-
fined as
Vi(σN |G)=
{
(1− δ)∑∞t=1 δt−1vi(ati atNi) if δ < 1

(wi(σN |G)) if δ= 1,
where 
(·) denotes the Banach–Mazur limit of a sequence. If ∞ denotes the set
of bounded sequences of real numbers, a Banach–Mazur limit is a linear functional

 :∞ → R such that (i) 
(e)= 1 if e= {11   } and (ii) 
(x1x2   )= 
(x2x3   ) for
any sequence {xt}∞t=0 ∈ ∞ (see Aliprantis and Border 2006). It can be shown that for any
sequence {xt}∞t=0 ∈ ∞,
lim inf
t→∞ x
t ≤
({xt}∞t=1)≤ limsup
t→∞
xt
Remark 1. For simplicity, we restrict players to use pure strategies. Since player i’s be-
liefs assign positive probability to a finite number of paths for any history inHiNi , linear-
ity ensures that the expectation of the Banach–Mazur limit is the same as the Banach–
Mazur limit of the expectation. Our analysis can be extended to mixed strategies with
infinite supports by using special Banach–Mazur limits, called medial limits, which can
be shown to exists under the continuum hypothesis (see Abdou and Mertens 1989).
Define the set of histories for the entire game to be
H = {∅} ∪
{ ∞⋃
t=1
[×ts=1AN]
}

Given a history h ∈ H, the realization of an information network G, and a profile of
strategies σN = (σ1σ2    σn), define the profile σhNG = (σh1N1σh2N2    σhnNn) in-
duced by the history h and the information network G in the standard way. A pair (Gh)
is referred to as a node of the dynamic game.3 A pair (Nihi) of a neighborhood and
an observed history (or simply an observed history hi, as its components identify the
neighbors of player i) is associated uniquely with information set I(hi) and vice versa.4
With some abuse of notation, we sometimes use hi to denote I(hi).
3Throughout, the term vertex is used to refer to the nodes of the information network, whereas the term
node is used to refer to the nodes of the extensive form game.
4Formally define I(hi)= I(Nihi)= {(Gh) |Ni =Ni and hi = hi}.
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A system of beliefs β defines at each information set I(hi) of player i the conditional
probability β(Gh|hi) of each node (Gh) ∈ I(hi). The marginal belief of a network G is
denoted by β(G|hi) and of a history h by β(h|hi).
2.3 Equilibrium properties
In this section, we define three properties of strategies. The first requires a strategy pro-
file to be a sequential equilibrium that is invariant with respect to any prior beliefs in a
subset of admissible beliefs.
Definition (-invariant equilibrium (-IE)). A strategy profile is a -invariant equi-
librium, ⊆A, if it is a sequential equilibrium for any prior beliefs in .
As strategies depend on the observed neighborhood, -invariance requires that the
players’ behavior is not affected by conditional beliefs about remote parts of the net-
work derived from priors in . Naturally, the scope of this requirement depends on the
choice of possible beliefs. Within the confines of such choice, invariance implies that
local responsiveness suffices for sequential rationality and equilibrium behavior. In a
related matter, -invariance also implies that prior beliefs need not be common, in-
sofar as they belong to the set . All the equilibrium constructions presented in the
paper satisfy some form of invariance. We highlight this property in our analysis as it
establishes that efficient behavior need not be fine-tuned to the exact beliefs about the
global monitoring structure: the network structure itself is immaterial in that only local
information matters for the determination of a player’s incentives.
The second property is straightforward and selects strategies in which every player
cooperates for any information network.
Definition (Collusive (CO)). A strategy profile is collusive if the sequence of stage-
game actions generated for any information network is such that the players play C in
every period.
The final property characterizes the robustness of an equilibrium to occasional de-
fections by players. This definition is similar to, yet marginally stronger than, the notion
of global stability defined in Kandori (1992).
Definition (-stability (-S)). A strategy profile satisfies -stability, ⊆A, if for any
information network G such that f (G) > 0 for some f ∈ and any history h ∈H, there
exists a period ThG such that all the players play C in all periods greater than T
h
G.
We deem equilibria that satisfy -stability to be of interest, as cooperation always
resumes after any number of mistakes.
The main results of this paper establish the existence of collusive strategy profiles
that are -invariant equilibria for various choices of , with -stability sometimes play-
ing a role in the equilibrium construction. Several additional robustness properties are
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discussed after each result. Obviously, the main hurdles are brought about by the restric-
tion that a player’s action applies indiscriminately to his entire neighborhood. If players
could choose a different action for each relationship, standard results would yield a folk
theorem.
3. Patient players
In this section, we show that when short-term incentives are inessential, as the players’
payoffs equal the long-term average, cooperation can be achieved via a simple strategy
profile that satisfies A-invariance and A-stability. In this profile, cooperation is “bal-
anced”: as the game unfolds from any history, in each relationship, a player will have
defected for the same number of periods as his opponent before reverting to permanent
cooperation.
This case is obviously of interest in and of itself when long-run payoffs are the
sole players’ motive in the strategic interaction. More importantly, it brings into fo-
cus two considerations. First, retaliatory punishments that are balanced, despite prop-
agating through the information network, always extinguish themselves in aggregate ei-
ther by reaching a player with only one neighbor or by neutralizing themselves when
they reach a player simultaneously from different directions. Second, such retalia-
tory behavior can be made consistent with sequential rationality because of the ir-
relevance of short-term incentives. If, in each relationship, a player will have ulti-
mately defected for the same number of periods as his opponent, there exists no a finite
bound that applies to all histories on the number of the defections that a player ex-
pects from his opponent. Thus, there may not be a discount rate sufficiently large to
neutralize short-term incentives after any history. As we see in the next section, when
the discount factor is less than unity, we induce short-term incentive compatibility by
abandoning balanced retaliations and bounding punishments at the expense of A-
stability.
To formulate the equilibrium strategies, first define a pair of state variables (dij dji) ∈
N
2+ for each relationship ij ∈G. Both state variables depend only on the history of past
play within the relationship and are, therefore, common knowledge for players i and j.
The number dij represents the number of periods in which player i will have to play
D as a consequence of the past play in relationship ij. The state variables’ transitions
are constructed so that (i) unilateral deviations to D are punished with an additional D
by the opponent; (ii) unilateral deviations to C are punished with an additional D both
by the player and by his opponent; (iii) joint deviations to the same action are not pun-
ished, whereas joint deviations to different actions are punished as unilateral deviations.
Thus, the transition rule for (dij dji) is defined as follows. In the first period, dij = 0 for
any ij ∈G. Thereafter, for any history h ∈H leading to state (dij dji) in the relationship
ij, if actions (ai aj) are chosen by players i and j, the states evolve according to the fol-
lowing table, where dij denotes the change in the variable dij and the plus sign denotes
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a strictly positive value:
dij 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + + + +
dji 0 0 0 0 + + + + + + + +
ai D D C C D D C C D D C C
aj D C D C D C D C D C D C
dij 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 −1 0 1 0
dji 0 1 0 0 0 2 −1 1 −1 1 0 0
(1)
Let dij(hi) denote the value of dij following a history hi ∈HiNi . We often abuse notation
and define dij(h) for a history h ∈H, where the terms not in hi enter vacuously. Define
the interim strategy ζiNi :HiNi → {CD} as
ζiNi(hi)=
{
C if maxj∈Ni dij(hi)= 0
D if maxj∈Ni dij(hi) > 0.
This interim strategy instructs each player i to defect if and only if at least one of his
“required” number of defections dij is positive. The strategy ζi of player i is the collection
of interim strategies {ζiM}M⊂N\{i}. A profile of such strategies is denoted by ζN .
Note that if dij > dji, the states return to (00) after dji periods of (DD) and dij − dji
periods of (DC). Hence, dij may be interpreted as the number of defections that players
i and j require from player i in the future to return to the initial state. The next theorem
shows that such a strategy profile satisfies the three properties of Section 2.3.
Theorem 1. If δ= 1, the strategy profile ζN satisfies CO, A-IE, and A-S.
The proof of Theorem 1 exploits two crucial attributes of the above strategies. First,
the strategy profile ζN satisfies A-stability. For a crude intuition, consider Figures 1
and 2. The number next to each vertex inside the graph denotes a player, the outside let-
ter denotes the actions, and the outside numbers on each edge denote the pair (dij dji).
Consider the pentagon in Figure 1. A deviation of player 1 spreads along the cycle and
is stopped by the simultaneous play of D by players 3 and 4. Consider now the hexagon.
Defections stop spreading because they reach player 4 simultaneously. Note how the
play of D that originates from player 1 moves away from player 1 in both directions.
That is, player 1 is a “source” of D’s. In the pentagon, after players 2 and 5 play D, the
play of D moves way from these players as well, that is, players 2 and 5 become sources.
Our proof strategy generalizes this observation: a source player always exists and the set
of source players expands. Figure 2 provides additional intuition about the “annihila-
tion” of D’s that occurs when players conform to the profile ζN . Note that the graph has
two cycles. Consider a history of length 10 in which player 1 deviates in the first period
only, player 2 does not respond and does play C for the first 10 periods, and all other
players always conform to the profile ζN . The first plot of Figure 2, depicts the state of
play at the beginning of period 10 when player 2 plays his final deviation to C. By pe-
riod 15, d21 = d23 and no player except player 2 plays D. Thus, defections die out in five
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Figure 1. The time period is denoted by t. The number next to a vertex inside the graph denotes
the player, the letter next to a vertex outside the graph denotes the action chosen in period t (the
letter is underlined if the player is deviating), and the outside numbers on an edge denote the
pair (dij dji) at the beginning of the period.
Figure 2. The time period is denoted by t. The number next to a vertex inside the graph denotes
the player, the letter next to a vertex outside the graph denotes the action chosen in period t (the
letter is underlined if the player is deviating), and the outside numbers on an edge denote the
pair (dij dji) at the beginning of the period.
periods. Notice one additional feature of ζN : when the play reverts to cooperation in all
relationships, all connected players will have played the same number of D’s.
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Second, the retaliatory nature of the profile ζN is such that in any relationship, a play
of (DC) is always matched by a later play of (CD). Hence, a payoff of 1+ g is followed
by a payoff of −l. As we shall see, this is the reason why A1 and A-stability guarantee
that after any history, conforming to the profile ζN yields an average payoff at least as
large as the average payoff from any deviation.
We first establish that the strategy profile ζN satisfies A-stability. For any history
h ∈H, define the “excess defection” in a relationship to be eij(h)= dij(h)−dji(h). Fix an
information network G and, for any history h ∈H and any path π = (j1     jm), define
Eπ(h)=
m−1∑
k=1
ejkjk+1(h)
to be the sum of the excess defections along the path. Let Pif be the set of paths with
initial vertex i and terminal vertex f , and let Pii be the set of cycles with initial vertex i.
Finally, let S(h) denote the set of players such that the aggregate excess defection on any
path departing from them is nonpositive, that is,
S(h)= {i ∈N |Eπ(h)≤ 0 for any π ∈ Pif  for any f ∈N}
Such players can be interpreted as the sources of D’s in the network in that defections
travel away from players in S(h). The next lemma shows that aggregate excess defections
along paths depend only on the initial and terminal vertices, and that S(h) is nonempty
for any history h. Let the function I(·) denote the indicator function.
Lemma 2. Consider an information network G. For any history (ha) ∈ H in which a
history h ∈H is followed by stage-game action profile a ∈AN , it must be that:
(i) If π ∈ Pif ,
Eπ(ha)=Eπ(h)+ I(ai 	= af )[I(ai = C)− I(ai =D)]
(ii) If κ ∈ Pii,
Eκ(h)= 0
(iii) If ππ ′ ∈ Pif ,
Eπ(h)=Eπ′(h)
(iv) The set S(h) is nonempty.
The next result uses Lemma 2 to establish that the strategy profile ζN satisfies A-
stability. The main idea of the proof is that the set S(h) expands when players play ac-
cording to the strategy profile ζN . The intuition follows by observing that, first, when
deviations “travel away” from a player i ∈ S(h), (dij dji), j ∈Ni, declines, and, second, if
a player i is in S(h) and has a neighbor j such that (dij(h)dji(h))= (00), then player j
is also in S(h).
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Lemma 3. The strategy profile ζN satisfiesA-S.
We use Lemmas 2 and 3 to prove Theorem 1. The intuition for the final leg of this re-
sult follows from the profile ζN being such that in any relationship, the outcome (DC)
is always matched by the outcome (CD). The difficulty consists in evaluating the payoff
of sequences for which no limit exists and in which deviations occur an infinite number
of times, as the one-shot deviation principle is inapplicable. Too see how these compli-
cations are resolved, consider any history. The strategy ζN specifies a future play for the
remainder of the game that leads to cooperation within finite time. Moreover, within any
finite horizon, the number of periods in which a player can gain g in any relationship by
deviating from ζN can be larger than the number of periods in which he incurs −l by at
most 1. This follows given that any deviation to defection is always met by an immedi-
ate defection and given that cooperation is restored only after the deviating player has
incurred −l. Then as a direct consequence of A1, a player cannot strictly gain from de-
viating as the time horizon grows large. Indeed, an infinite number of deviations brings
the payoff strictly below the cooperative payoff.
Proof of Theorem 1. The profile ζN trivially satisfies CO. We now show that for any
history h ∈H,
Vi(ζhNG|G)≥ Vi(θi ζh−iG|G)
for any interim strategy θi ∈ iNi , any G ∈ (Ni), and any i ∈ N . One can easily verify
that -IE then follows.
Consider any history h ∈H of length z− 1. Notice that by A-S, (ii) in the definition
of Banach–Mazur limits, and linearity,
Vi(ζhNG|G)=
∑
j∈Ni
ηij
Hence, ζN is A-IE if and only if for any player i ∈ N and for any interim strategy
θi ∈ iNi , ∑
j∈Ni
ηij ≥ Vi(θi ζh−iG|G) for any G ∈ (Ni)
Let {atN }∞t=z be the sequence of stage-game actions generated by (θi ζh−iG) after history
h when the information network is G. Define h
t
, t ≥ z − 1, to be the history of length t
generated by the strategy profile (θi ζh−iG) after history h, that is, h
z−1 = h, and define,
for any t ≥ z, ht+1 = (ht at+1N ). Consider any relationship ij ∈G. Omitting some depen-
dent variables for notational convenience, define a variable that counts how many times
an action profile (ai aj) has been played by the pair ij between periods s and s + T in
history h
s+T
, s ≥ z:
nsij(ai aj|T)=
s+T∑
t=s
I(ati = ai)I(atj = aj)
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Then, from (1) and the definition of eij(·), for any s ≥ z,
nsij(DC|0)− nsij(CD|0)= eij(h
s−1
)− eij(hs)
which trivially implies that
nzij(DC|T)− nzij(CD|T) =
T+z∑
t=z
(ntij(DC|0)− ntij(CD|0))
= eij(hz−1)− eij(hT+z)≡ z(T)
Notice that eij(h
t
) < 0 implies that dji(h
t
) > 0, which implies that at+1j =D, which finally
implies that eij(h
t+1
)≥ eij(ht). Thus, when player j plays according to ζj after history h,
it must be the case that for any T , eij(h
T+z
)≥ −1 if eij(hz−1) > 0 and eij(hT+z)≥ eij(hz−1)
if eij(h
z−1
) < 0. Hence, for some Mz > 0, z(T) ≤ Mz for every T . It follows that the
payoff of player i in relationship ij must satisfy
T+z∑
t=z
uij(a
t
i a
t
j) = nzij(CC|T)+ (1+ g)nzij(DC|T)− lnzij(CD|T)
= nzij(CC|T)+
1+ g− l
2
2nzij(CD|T)+ (1+ g)z(T)
Note that
nzij(CC|T)+ 2nzij(CD|T)+ nzij(DD|T)+z(T)= T + 1
and that, by A1, 1+ g− l < 2. Then, since z(T)≤MZ for every T ,
limsup
T→∞
∑T+z
t=z uij(ati a
t
j)
T + 1 ≤ 1
Therefore, the Banach–Mazur limit satisfies


({∑T+z
t=z uij(ati a
t
j)
T + 1
}∞
T=0
)
≤ 1
The claim follows as Banach–Mazur limits are linear. 
Comments. Theorem 1 applies to several extensions of the baseline model. First, it is
trivially robust to uncertainty on the number of players. Second, payoffs can be het-
erogeneous and allowed to depend on each relationship as long as A1 holds in all rela-
tionships. Indeed, Theorem 1 works even if payoffs are private information as long as
they satisfy A1 in all possible realizations. Second, nowhere in the proof of Theorem 1
is it assumed that ηij > 0 for any ij ∈ G. Indeed, the arguments hold when ηij = 0 for
some ij ∈G. Thus, this result extends to the case in which the set of players observed by
another player is larger than the set of players that affect this player’s payoff.
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We allow a pair (dij dji) to grow unboundedly to prevent D’s from cycling around
the graph. Intuitively, suppose that ij is a relationship on a cycle. If player i fails to
respond once to a play of (CD) in relationship ij, D propagates only in one direction
and enters a cycle. To “extinguish” this D, player i must play D so that D travels in the
opposite direction as well. Although the network is finite, local information prevents
the players from finding the smallest number of “counterbalancing” D’s that prevent
periodicity of punishments. Therefore, because strategies rely only on local information,
all D’s propagating in one direction must be offset by the same number of D’s in the
opposite direction.
4. Impatient players
This section studies games with players who have discount factors below 1. The first
subsection introduces strategies and proves some preliminary results. The strategies
constructed here are variants of the strategy discussed in Section 3. Punishments re-
main contagious and spread through the information network, but the maximal num-
ber of defections expected by any neighbor is bounded. Thus, retaliations are no longer
balanced in the sense discussed in the previous section. To see why the profile ζN needs
to be modified when the discount factors are below 1, suppose that the information net-
work is a large star network. Take a history of length T in which one peripheral player
always plays D and the remaining players always play C. It straightforward to check that
the longer T is, the larger δ must be for the central player to comply with ζN , and that
no lower bound less than 1 exists for such δ.
Since retaliations are not balanced, inducing incentive compatibility runs into the
problem that defections can cycle. In particular, players may expect defections to reach
them in the future, even when cooperation has resumed in each of their relationships.
Checking sequential rationality in such cases is extremely demanding. It is possible to
circumvent this difficulty with a rather direct approach that restricts the set of informa-
tion networks. This section shows how to extend such an approach to our general frame-
work. In Section A.1, we prove that if priors assign positive probability only to acyclic
information networks, a simple -invariant equilibrium exists that satisfies CO and -
stability. This result is a stepping stone for the main theorem presented here, which
establishes that if prior beliefs have full support, the very same strategy profile satisfies
sequential rationality for an appropriate selection of a consistent system of beliefs. Nu-
merous robustness properties of these bounded-punishment strategies are discussed
after the main result.
4.1 Strategies and preliminary results
This subsection introduces the strategy profile ξN that differs from that in Section 3 in
that the maximal number of defections expected from any player is bounded by 2. As
before, two state variables (dij dji) characterize the state of each relationship ij ∈G, and
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require each player i to defect if and only if at least one of his “required” number of
defections dij is positive. Thus, for hi ∈HiNi ,
ξiNi(hi)=
{
C if maxj∈Ni dij(hi)= 0
D if maxj∈Ni dij(hi) > 0,
where dij(hi) is the value of dij after history hi.
The transitions for the state variables (dij dji) differ from Section 3 and depend on
the sign of the payoff parameter l.
Case l > 0. In the first period, dij = 0 for any ij ∈ G. Given a state (dij dji) and actions
(ai aj) for the relationship ij, the state in the next period is determined by the transition
rule
dij 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + + + +
dji 0 0 0 0 + + + + + + + +
ai D D C C D D C C D D C C
aj D C D C D C D C D C D C
dij 0 0 2 0 0 dji 0 dji −1 0 0 0
dji 0 2 0 0 0 0 −1 0 −1 0 0 0
where dij , as before, denotes the change in variable dij and the plus sign denotes a
strictly positive value.
Case l < 0. In the first period, dij = 0 for any ij ∈ G. Given a state (dij dji) and actions
(ai aj) for the relationship ij, the state in the next period is determined by the transition
rule
dij 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + + + +
dji 0 0 0 0 + + + + + + + +
ai D D C C D D C C D D C C
aj D C D C D C D C D C D C
dij 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 −1 2− dij 2− dij 2− dij
dji 0 1 0 0 −1 −1 −1 2− dji −1 2− dji 2− dji 2− dji
where dij , again, denotes the change in variable dij and the plus sign denotes a strictly
positive value.
Case l = 0. Choose either transition rule.
We denote a profile of such strategies by ξN .5 To achieve incentive compatibility
at every information set, (dij dji) is bounded by (22) in all cases. Note that when the
stage game is the prisoner’s dilemma, equilibrium punishments following a deviation
from the efficient play last for two periods. To see why, consider a player who needs
to punish his opponent in one relationship, but to cooperate in a second relationship
in which his opponent is expected to play D. If this player delays the punishment in
5We omit the dependence on parameter l for simplicity.
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the first relationship by one period and, thus, temporarily restores cooperation in the
second, he will have to defect in the next period to restore cooperation in the first. Such
action is then a new deviation in the second relationship and, thus, triggers a two-period
punishment. One can easily see that if a one-period punishment was, instead, triggered,
delaying the punishment by one period in the first relationship can yield a higher payoff
in the second when 1+ g− l > 0.
The following result is instrumental to the proof of the main theorems of this sec-
tion. It provides sufficient conditions for player i never to expect his neighbors to play
D because of the past play in relationships to which player i does not belong. These
conditions are (i) all deviations have occurred in player i’s neighborhood and (ii) no two
neighbors of player i are connected by a path.
Given a history h ∈ H of length T and a network G, let D(Gh t) denote the set of
players who deviate from the strategy profile ξN in period t ≤ T . Further, define
D(Gh)=
T⋃
t=1
D(Gh t)
Again, let dij(h) be the value of dij following history h. A component of an undirected
graph is a maximal subgraph in which any two vertices are connected to each other by a
path. A relationship ij ∈G is a bridge in G if its deletion from G increases the number of
components.
Lemma 4. Consider a networkG, a player i ∈N , and a history h ∈H such that
(i) D(Gh)⊆Ni ∪ {i}
(ii) if j ∈D(Gh) \ {i}, the relationship ij is a bridge inG.
Then djk(h)= 0 for any j ∈Ni and k ∈Nj \ {i}.
The proof proceeds by induction. It shows that if all deviations have occurred in
player i’s neighborhood, and if there is no cycle that includes player i and his deviating
neighbors, then player i never expects any one of his neighbors to defect in response to
behavior outside their relationship, regardless of his actions. Intuitively, since defections
spread outward in the information network, they can only return to player i if there is a
cycle that connects i to a deviating player.
4.2 Full support
This section establishes that the strategy profile ξN is a -invariant equilibrium that
satisfies CO whenever prior beliefs have full support. Some of the arguments developed
here rely on the analysis of acyclic networks that appears in Section A.1. Let FS be the
set of prior beliefs that have full support, that is, if f ∈FS, then f (G) > 0 for any G. The
main idea of the proof consists in constructing a consistent system of beliefs such that
all deviations are “local” and do not spread. That is, beliefs will be such that following
a deviation by a neighbor, a player believes that this neighbor is isolated. Naturally, the
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assumption of full support is crucial for this task. The perturbations of the equilibrium
strategies needed in the construction of our consistent system of beliefs are chosen to
converge pointwise to the equilibrium strategy.
Fix a player i with a neighborhood Ni. Let G∗i denote the network in which Nj = {i}
for any player j ∈ Ni and Nj = N \ {Ni ∪ {i j}} for any j /∈ Ni ∪ {i}. That is, G∗i consists
of an incomplete star network, in which player i is the center and the players in Ni are
the periphery, and a disjoint, totally connected component.6 Consider the strategy ξN .
Given a history hi observed by player i when i’s neighborhood is Ni, let h∗(hi) be the
history such that (G∗i  h
∗(hi)) ∈ I(hi) and every player j /∈Ni ∪ {i} plays according to ξN
(i.e., plays C) in every period. Hence, at the node (G∗i  h
∗(hi)), all deviations are local
in that they occurred only in player i’s relationships. We say that player j ∈Ni i-deviates
from ξN at the observed history hi if
j ∈D(G∗i  h∗(hi))
that is, if player j does not play according to ξN on the path to hi when the network is G∗i .
The next lemma shows that it is possible to construct a consistent belief system such
that for any player i, (i) whenever a player j i-deviates, player i believes that player j’s
neighborhood contains only player i, and (ii) player i believes that all deviations occur
in his relationships. This is achieved by assuming that trembles are such that a deviation
by a player with a singleton neighborhood is infinitely more likely than a deviation by a
player with a larger neighborhood and are such that, as in the proof of Theorem 7, more
recent deviations are infinitely more likely than less recent ones.
Lemma 5. If priors beliefs are in FS, there exists a system of beliefs β that is consistent
with strategy profile ξN such that for any player i ∈N and observed history hi of length T ,
the following claims hold:
(a) If player j ∈Ni i-deviates, then β(Gh|hi)= 0 for any (Gh) ∈ I(hi) for whichG is
such thatNj 	= {i}.
(b) If (Gh) ∈ I(hi) and for some t ≤ T ,
D(Gh t) 	=D(G∗i  h∗(hi) t)
then β(Gh|hi)= 0.
The proof of the main result of this subsection follows from the preceding lemma
and Lemma 4.
Theorem 6. If δ is sufficiently close to 1, the strategy profile ξN satisfies CO and FS-IE.
Proof. The strategy profiles clearly satisfy CO. We now establish FS-IE. In particular,
it is shown that given the system of beliefs β characterized in Lemma 5, it is sequentially
6The particular form of the latter component is inessential.
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rational to comply with the equilibrium strategy for any profile of prior beliefs that sat-
isfies A3. Fix a player i ∈N , a history hi of length T observed by player i, and node (Gh)
such that β(Gh|hi) > 0. By Lemmas 4 and 5, for j ∈ Ni and k ∈ Nj \ {i}, djk(h′) = 0 for
any history h′ that has h as a subhistory and D(Gh′) \ D(Gh) ⊆ {i}. Any player i be-
lieves that for any neighbor j ∈Ni, djk(h′)= 0 for any k ∈Nj \ {i}. Consequently, player i
believes that the action of a neighbor j ∈ Ni at any history h′ is solely determined by
dji(h
′). Thus, the verification of sequential rationality is identical to the case in which
networks are acyclic, and it appears in Theorem 7 below. Property FS-IE follows imme-
diately, as the strategies are independent of the prior beliefs. 
Comments. The strategy profile of Theorem 6 is such that all players believe that de-
fections spread away and never return, and that cooperation is restored permanently
within two periods. This follows immediately from the above proof, noting that no
player expects defections to cycle and that the number of defections expected from a
player in any of his relationships is bounded by two. Of course, such stability in “belief”
may or may not coexist with the actual systemic robustness of a permanent reversion to
cooperation within finite time. Nevertheless, it does point out that it is possible to con-
struct sequential equilibria in which incentives are always perceived as local. In such
equilibria, defections are reactive and never anticipatory, that is, players do not defect
in anticipation of forthcoming defections.
Several the robustness properties of the equilibrium strategy of Section 3 are satis-
fied by the equilibrium strategy of this section, provided that the ordinal properties of
the games are the same across all relationships. Uncertainty about the number of play-
ers, heterogeneity in payoffs, and uncertainty about payoffs consistent with A1 can be
allowed for without compromising the results. The equilibrium in this section is also
robust to heterogeneity in discount rates. Theorem 6 can also be extended to the case in
which ηij = ηji = 0 for some ij ∈ G. This is again achieved by using the same system of
beliefs as in Theorem 6, but modifying the strategies so that dij = 0 in any relationship ij
for which ηij = 0, that is, deviations in relationship ij are ignored. The intuition follows
from such deviations being irrelevant for the immediate payoffs and not being expected
to return via a different path.
The assumption of full support can be dispensed with when l > 0 by adapting an
argument first used by Ellison (1994).7 Note that a simple grim trigger strategy sustains
cooperation for values of δ in some interval (δδ). Then cooperation can be extended
to any δ ∈ (δ/δ1) by partitioning the game into T − 1 independent games played every
T periods and by playing according to grim trigger strategies in each of the indepen-
dent games. The number T is chosen so that implied discount rate δT is in (δδ). The
equilibrium profile, however, is not robust to heterogeneous stage-game payoffs and, in
particular, to heterogeneous discount rates, since all players must partition the repeated
game into independent games of identical length. Moreover, a player who defects in one
of the T − 1 games never returns to cooperation in that game. Play eventually settles on
constant defection in the component in which this player resides. Thus, such equilibria
never satisfy -stability.
7See Nava and Piccione (2011).
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The full support assumption is helpful in establishing Theorem 6, as it allows suf-
ficient flexibility in the determination of appropriate posterior beliefs. In particular, in
the proof, posterior beliefs are concentrated on networks that never lead to cycles of
defections in histories in which deviations were observed. In a network environment,
McBride (2006) exploits an analogous flexibility in posteriors by adopting the notion of
conjectural equilibrium in Gilli (1999).
Appendix
A.1 Acyclic networks
In this subsection, we circumvent the problem of cycling defections by restricting the
class of information networks. In particular, we prove that if priors assign positive prob-
ability only to acyclic information networks, the profile of strategies introduced in Sec-
tion 4.1 is a -invariant equilibrium that satisfies CO and -stability. That efficiency can
be easily obtained with relatively simple strategies in any acyclic network is of interest
in cases in which a planner chooses the information network as in Haag and Lagunoff
(2006). Moreover, this result is a stepping stone for Theorem 6, which establishes that
if prior beliefs have full support, then the very same strategy profile satisfies sequential
rationality for an appropriate selection of a consistent system of beliefs. Let NC be the
set of admissible beliefs such that if f ∈NC and f (G) > 0, then G is acyclic.
Theorem 7. If δ is sufficiently close to 1, the strategy profile ξN satisfies CO,NC-IE, and
NC-S.
We first establish that the equilibrium strategy satisfies NC-stability and then we
prove the general theorem.
Lemma 8. The strategy profile ξN satisfiesNC-S.
Proof. Suppose that G is a tree and consider any history. For notational simplicity,
assume that G is connected. If the players play according to the profile ξN , the possible
transitions are given by
if l ≥ 0
dij 0 0 0 0 0 0 +
dji 0 0 0 0 + + +
ai D D C C D C D
aj D C D C D D D
dij 0 0 2 0 0 0 −1
dji 0 2 0 0 0 −1 −1
if l ≤ 0
dij 0 0 0 0 0 0 +
dji 0 0 0 0 + + +
ai D D C C D C D
aj D C D C D D D
dij 0 0 1 0 0 0 −1
dji 0 1 0 0 −1 −1 −1
We prove the claim by induction on the number of players. It is easily verified that NC-
stability holds for n= 2. Suppose that n > 2. Consider a relationship ij such that player i
is the unique neighbor of player j (player j is a terminal vertex). First note that if dij = 0,
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it remains so for the remainder of the game. Consequently, if dij = 0, the relationship ij
is superfluous for the play of player i, as player i plays D if and only if dik > 0 for some
neighbor k 	= j. Hence, by induction, there exists a period t such that the play of all the
players in the network in which the relationship ij is removed is C in all periods greater
than t. Obviously, the same holds for player j for some period t ′ ≥ t. Conversely, if dij > 0,
since player j’s only neighbor is player i, then dij becomes zero after a finite number of
periods and the above argument applies again. 
The proof of Theorem 7 exploits NC-stability to establish that the strategy pro-
file ξN is a NC-invariant equilibrium. In the first part of the argument, we construct
consistent beliefs such that players believe that deviations occur only in their neighbor-
hood. This is achieved by defining trembles for which more recent deviations to D are
infinitely more likely than less recent deviations. Such beliefs imply that any player i
believes that the action of a neighbor j ∈ Ni at any history h is determined exclusively
by dji(h). For example, consider the prisoner’s dilemma and a linear information net-
work with three players in which player 1 is connected to player 2 who is connected to
player 3. If player 1, upon observing a defection believes that it originated with player 3
two period earlier, he expects player 2 to defect twice. If, instead, he believes that the
defection originated with player 2, he expects no further defections. In our construc-
tion, consistent beliefs correspond to the latter case. The second part of the argument is
a tedious step-by-step verification that sequential rationality holds given such a system
of beliefs.
Comments. Acyclic graphs allow us to bound punishments, since deviations do not cy-
cle even if retaliations are not balanced. Thus, we are able to obtain NC-stability. Fur-
thermore, at any history, cooperation is restored after no more than 3n periods. All the
robustness properties of the equilibrium strategy of Section 3 are satisfied by the equi-
librium strategy of this section provided that the ordinal properties of the games are the
same across all relationships. Uncertainty about the number of players, heterogeneity
in payoffs, and uncertainty about payoffs consistent with A1 can be allowed for without
compromising the results. The equilibrium in this section is also robust to heterogeneity
in discount rates. Theorem 7 can be easily extended to the case in which ηij = ηji = 0 for
some ij ∈G. This is achieved by using the same beliefs as in Theorem 7, but modifying
the strategies so that deviations in a relationship ij for which ηij = 0 are not punished,
that is, dij = 0. Such deviations are inconsequential for players i and j, as they do not
affect current payoffs and never return.
Proving Theorem 7 We begin with a preliminary lemma.
Lemma 9. If the prior beliefs are inNC , there exists a system of beliefsβ that is consistent
with strategy profile ξN such that for any history hi ∈ HiNi observed by a player i ∈ N , if
β(Gh|hi) > 0 for some (Gh) ∈ I(hi), then D(Gh)⊆Ni ∪ {i}.
Proof. Consider trembles such that (i) a deviation to D by player i in period t when
maxj dij = 0 occurs with probability εαt , where 1> n(α/(1− α)), and (ii) a deviation to C
300 Nava and Piccione Theoretical Economics 9 (2014)
by player i in period t when maxj dij > 0 occurs with probability ε2. As ε→ 0, any finite
number of deviations to D is infinitely more likely than a single deviation to C and any
finite number of recent deviations toD is infinitely more likely than one earlier deviation
to D. Given the sequence of completely mixed behavior strategy profiles ξεN obtained by
adding these trembles to the profile ξN , let θε(Gh) be the probability of node (Gh).
The strategy ξεN is such that for every information set I(hi) of player i, the conditional
belief of node (Gh) ∈ I(hi),
βε(Gh|hi)= θ
ε(Gh)∑
(G′h′)∈I(hi) θ
ε(G′h′)

converges as ε→ 0, since each θε(Gh) is a polynomial.
Consider an acyclic network G for which f (G) > 0, and a player i and a neighbor
j ∈ Ni. Consider any history hi ∈ HiNi and let h+(hi) ∈ H denote the unique history
of play (Gh+(hi)) ∈ I(hi) in which all players, but for players in Ni ∪ {i}, comply with
the equilibrium strategy, that is, all the deviations observed by player i are attributed to
j’s behavior. Let hsi denote the subhistory of hi of length s, let a
s
j denote the action of
player j in period s, and define
Tj = {s | dji(hsi )= 0 and asj =D}
The probability of history h+(hi) then satisfies
θε(Gh+(hi)) = x(ε)y(ε)
∏
j∈Ni
∏
s∈Tj
εα
s
= x(ε)y(ε)ε
∑
j∈Ni
∑
s∈Tj α
s

since Lemma 4 applies for j ∈ Ni, djk(h+(hi)) = 0 for any k ∈ Nj \ {i}. The term x(ε)
is a product that includes the prior and probabilities of “nondeviations,” and y(ε) is
a product of the probabilities of deviations to C by players in Ni directly observed by
player i (dji(hsi ) > 0 and a
s
j = C). Obviously,
lim
ε→0
x(ε)= f (G)
Now consider any other history such that (Gh) ∈ I(hi). Suppose that such a history
displays a deviation to C that is not directly observed by player i. Then by construction,
θε(Gh)≤ y(ε)ε2
Thus, n(α/(1− α)) < 1 implies that
lim
ε→0
θε(Gh)
θε(Gh+(hi))
≤ lim
ε→0
1
x(ε)
ε
2−∑j∈Ni∑s∈Tj αs = 0
since ∑
s∈Tj
αs <
∞∑
s=0
αs < 2
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Consider now a history h′ in which all deviations to C have been directly observed by
player i. Let t denote the first period in which djk(h′t ) > 0 for some k ∈Nj \ i. Then
θε(Gh′)≤ y(ε)εαt
∏
j∈Ni
∏
s∈Tj |s≤t
εα
s

Now n(α/(1− α)) < 1 implies that
lim
ε→0
θε(Gh′)
θε(Gh+(hi))
≤ lim
ε→0
1
x(ε)
ε
αt−∑j∈Ni∑s∈Tj |s>t αs = 0
since
n
∑
s∈Tj |s>t
αs < n
∞∑
s=t+1
αs < αt
Since there are only finitely many histories in I(hi), it must be that limε→0βε(Gh|hi) >
0 only if h= h+(hi). Therefore player i believes that D(Gh)⊆Ni ∪ {i}. 
We now turn to the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 7. Property CO is obvious. Tables are added as supplementary
material to clarify the evolution of payoffs within a neighborhood after a defection.
To prove NC-IE, consider the system of beliefs β as in Lemma 9. Then, for any his-
tory hi ∈ HiNi observed by player i ∈ N , if β(Gh|hi) > 0 for some (Gh) ∈ I(hi), then
D(Gh) ⊆ Ni ∪ {i}. Thus, since any relationship ij ∈ G is a bridge, the conditions of
Lemma 4 hold. Hence, for j ∈ Ni and k ∈ Nj \ {i}, djk(h′) = 0 for any history h′ that
has h as a subhistory and D(Gh′) \ D(Gh) ⊆ {i}. Thus, any player i believes that for
any neighbor j ∈Ni, djk(h′)= 0 for any k ∈Nj \ {i}. Consequently, player i believes that
the action of a neighbor j ∈Ni at any history h′ is solely determined by dji(h′).
To check sequential rationality, we need to consider two separate cases. First assume
that l ≥ 0. Given any history, seven values of (dij dji) are possible, namely (00), (10),
(01), (11), (02), (20), and (22). First consider the case in which maxj∈Ni dij(hi) = 0
and, thus, ξi(hi) = C. If player i is sufficiently patient, he prefers to comply with the
equilibrium strategy, since the payoff differences between complying and a one-shot
deviation to D with any neighbor j ∈Ni are
(1+ l)(δ+ δ2)− g if (dij dji)= (00)
−l+ δ(1+ l) if (dij dji)= (01)
−l+ δ2(1+ l) if (dij dji)= (02)
which are positive by A1 and are l ≥ 0 when δ is sufficiently close to 1.
If maxj∈Ni dij(hi) = 1, then ξi(hi) = D. A one-shot deviation to C causes the maxi-
mum dij to remain equal to 1 in the next period for some j ∈Ni. The payoff differences
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are
(1+ g)(1− δ)+ δ3 − 1+ l(δ3 − δ) if (dij dji)= (00)
l+ (δ2 + δ3)(1+ l)− δ(1+ g+ l) if (dij dji)= (01)
g+ δ if (dij dji)= (10)
l+ δ if (dij dji)= (11)
l(1− δ) if (dij dji)= (02)
As δ → 1, the first and the last expression converge to zero, while the remaining three
expressions become strictly positive. Since maxj∈Ni dij(hi) = 1, a neighbor exists with
whom player i strictly loses by deviating to C when δ is close to 1. Since ηij > 0 for any
j ∈Ni, a deviation to C strictly decreases payoffs for δ close to 1.
Finally, suppose that maxdij(hi)= 2. A one-shot deviation to C causes the maximum
dij to remain equal to 2 in the next period for some j ∈Ni. The payoff differences are
(1+ g)(1− δ)− (1− δ4)− l(δ2 − δ4) if (dij dji)= (00)
−δ(1+ g)+ δ3 + δ4 + (1− δ2 + δ3 + δ4)l if (dij dji)= (01)
(1+ g)(1+ δ− δ2)− (1− δ4)− l(δ2 − δ4) if (dij dji)= (10)
(1+ g)(δ− δ2)+ δ4 + (1− δ2 + δ4)l if (dij dji)= (11)
l(1− δ2) if (dij dji)= (02)
(1+ δ)(1+ g)+ δ2 − 1 if (dij dji)= (20)
l+ δ2 if (dij dji)= (22)
As δ→ 1, the first and the fifth expressions converge to zero, while the remaining expres-
sions become strictly positive. Since maxj∈Ni dij(hi) = 2, a neighbor exists with whom
player i strictly loses by deviating to C when δ is close to 1. Since ηij > 0 for any j ∈Ni, a
deviation to C strictly decreases payoffs for δ close to 1.
Next assume that l ≤ 0. Given any history, five values of (dij dji) are possible, namely
(00), (10), (01), (11), and (22). First consider the case in which maxj∈Ni dij(hi) = 0
and, thus, ξi(hi) = C. If player i is sufficiently patient, he prefers to comply with the
equilibrium strategy, since the payoff differences between complying and a one-shot
deviation to D with any neighbor j ∈Ni are
−g+ (1+ l)δ if (dij dji)= (00)
−l if (dij dji)= (01)
As δ→ 1, the first expression is strictly positive and the second is weakly positive by A1
and l ≤ 0.
If maxj∈Ni dij(hi) = 1, then ξi(hi) = D. A one-shot deviation to C causes the maxi-
mum dij to increase to 2 in the next period for some j ∈Ni. The payoff differences are
g− (1+ g+ l)δ+ δ2 if (dij dji)= (00)
l− δg+ δ2 if (dij dji)= (01)
g+ δ+ δ2 if (dij dji)= (10)
l+ δ+ δ2 if (dij dji)= (11)
As δ→ 1, the first expression is weakly positive and the remaining expressions become
strictly positive, since 1 > g − l by A1. Since maxj∈Ni dij(hi) = 1, a neighbor exists with
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whom player i strictly loses by deviating to C when δ is close to 1. Since ηij > 0 for any
j ∈Ni, a deviation to C strictly decreases payoffs for δ close to 1.
Finally, suppose that maxdij(hi)= 2. A one-shot deviation to C causes the maximum
dij to remain equal to 2 in the next period for some j ∈Ni. The payoff differences are
g− (1+ g)δ+ δ2 if (dij dji)= (00)
l(1− δ2) if (dij dji)= (01)
g+ (1+ g)δ− lδ2 if (dij dji)= (10)
l(1− δ2)+ (1+ g)δ if (dij dji)= (11)
l+ δ2 if (dij dji)= (22)
As δ → 1, the first and the second expressions converge to zero, while the remaining
expressions become strictly positive. Since maxj∈Ni dij(hi) = 2, a neighbor exists with
whom player i strictly loses by deviating to C when δ is close to 1. Since ηij > 0 for any
j ∈Ni, a deviation to C strictly decreases payoffs for δ close to 1.
Since the incentives to conform to ξN are not affected by the beliefs about the graph,
the proof is complete. 
Supplementary notes The following tables clarify the incentive constraints in the proof
of Theorem 7. Each entry shows the payoff in periods following either no deviation or a
one-shot deviation by player i from the strategy ξi when the relationship with player j
was in state (dij dji). Payoffs are omitted after a relationship returns to the state (00).
If l ≥ 0 and maxj∈Ni dij(hi)= 0,
Equilibrium: C Deviation: D
(dij dji) t t + 1 t + 2 t t + 1 t + 2
(00) 1 1 1 1+ g −l −l
(01) −l 1 1 0 −l 1
(02) −l −l 1 0 −l −l
If l ≥ 0 and maxj∈Ni dij(hi)= 1,
Equilibrium: D Deviation: C
(dij dji) t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3
(00) 1+ g −l −l 1 1 1+ g −l −l
(01) 0 −l 1 1 −l 1+ g −l −l
(10) 1+ g 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
(11) 0 1 1 1 −l 0 1 1
(02) 0 −l −l 1 −l 0 −l 1
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If l ≥ 0 and maxj∈Ni dij(hi)= 2,
Equilibrium: D Deviation: C
(dij dji) t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4
(00) 1+ g 0 −l −l 1 1 1+ g 0 −l −l
(01) 0 0 −l 1 1 −l 1+ g 0 −l −l
(10) 1+ g 1+ g −l −l 1 1 0 1+ g −l −l
(11) 0 1+ g −l −l 1 −l 0 1+ g −l −l
(02) 0 0 −l −l 1 −l 0 0 −l 1
(20) 1+ g 1+ g 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
(22) 0 0 1 1 1 −l 0 0 1 1
If l ≤ 0 and maxj∈Ni dij(hi)= 0,
Equilibrium: C Deviation: D
(dij dji) t t + 1 t + 2 t t + 1 t + 2
(00) 1 1 1 1+ g −l 1
(01) −l 1 1 0 1 1
If l ≤ 0 and maxj∈Ni dij(hi)= 1,
Equilibrium: D Deviation: C
(dij dji) t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3
(00) 1+ g −l 1 1 1 1+ g 0 1
(01) 0 1 1 1 −l 1+ g 0 1
(10) 1+ g 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
(11) 0 1 1 1 −l 0 0 1
If l ≤ 0 and maxj∈Ni dij(hi)= 2,
Equilibrium: D Deviation: C
(dij dji) t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3
(00) 1+ g 0 1 1 1 1+ g 0 1
(01) 0 1+ g −l 1 −l 1+ g 0 1
(10) 1+ g 1+ g −l 1 1 0 0 1
(11) 0 1+ g −l 1 −l 0 0 1
(22) 0 0 1 1 −l 0 0 1
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Figure 3. Changes in excess defections are reported on any given link for a particular action
profile chosen by the players on a path.
A.2 Omitted proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof first establishes (i) and then proceeds by induction to
prove (ii) and (iii). Consider a history (ha). Notice that, by definition,
eij(ha)= eij(h)+ I(ai 	= aj)[I(ai = C)− I(ai =D)]
Hence, for any path π = (j1     jm) ∈ Pif ,
Eπ(ha) = Eπ(h)+
m−1∑
k=1
I(ajk 	= ajk+1)[I(ajk = C)− I(ajk =D)]
= Eπ(h)+ I(ai 	= af )[I(ai = C)− I(ai =D)]
The last equality holds by a simple counting argument. Consider the sequence of action
pairs {(ajk ajk+1)}m−1k=1 . First remove all the pairs of actions (ajk ajk+1) for which ajk =
ajk+1 , since I(ajk 	= ajk+1) = 0. Since the stage game has only two actions, if the actions
played at the beginning and at the end of the path coincide (ai = af ), we are left with an
even number of alternating pairs. If actions played at the beginning and at the end do
not coincide (ai 	= af ), we are left with an odd number of alternating pairs. The desired
equality then follows. Figure 3 presents a visual intuition for the claim.
Notice that (i) and a simple induction argument imply (ii). When h is empty,
(ii) holds trivially. If (ii) holds for any history h, it also holds for a history (ha), since
ai = af in a cycle. A similar induction argument also establishes (iii).
Claim (iv) is also proved by induction. When h is the empty history, dij(h) = 0 for
any ij ∈G, and (iv) holds trivially since S(h)=N . Suppose that (iv) holds for a history h.
Consider the history h′ = (ha) and a player i ∈ S(h). If i ∈ S(h′), the claim holds. Sup-
pose then that i /∈ S(h′). Since i ∈ S(h), by (i) there exists at least one path π ∈ Pij such
that Eπ(h′)= 1. We show that this implies that j ∈ S(h′). Consider any path π ′ ∈ Pjf and
any path π ′′ ∈ Pif for any f ∈N . Note that, by (i), Eπ′′(h′)≤ 1 and, by (iii),
Eπ′(h
′) = Eπ′′(h′)−Eπ(h′)
= Eπ′′(h′)− 1≤Eπ′′(h)≤ 0
which establishes (iv). 
Proof of Lemma 3. Fix an information network G. Consider any history h ∈ H of
length t. Following any history, the players’ actions for the remainder of the game are
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determined by ζN . Thus, in any relationship ij ∈ G, the state transitions take place ac-
cording to the table
dij 0 0 0 0 0 0 +
dji 0 0 0 0 + + +
ai D D C C D C D
aj D C D C D D D
dij 0 0 1 0 0 0 −1
dji 0 1 0 0 0 −1 −1
Let
T(h)= max
ij∈G
{min{dij(h)dji(h)}}
and let hs+ denote the history s periods longer than h that is generated by ζN after his-
tory h. If all players play according to ζN after history h, for any z > T(h), all the rela-
tionships ij satisfy min{dij(hz+)dji(hz+)} = 0, that is, either dij(hz+) or dji(hz+) is equal to
zero. To show that the strategy satisfies A-stability, it is sufficient to prove that for any
history h ∈H and for any z > T(h),
(A) S(hz+)⊆ S(hz+1+ )
(B) if S(hz+) 	=N , S(hz+) 	= S(hz+k+ ) for some k> 0.
Indeed, if both statements were to hold, A-S would follow trivially, as S(hz+)=N for z
sufficiently large, and S(hz+)=N if and only if maxij∈G{dij(hz+)} = 0. We establish (A) by
contradiction. Consider a player i such that i ∈ S(hz+) for z > T(h) and i /∈ S(hz+1+ ). Then
there exists a path π ∈ Pif such that
Eπ(h
z+)= 0 and Eπ(hz+1+ )= 1
Since i ∈ S(hz+), by (i) of Lemma 2, ζf (hz+)=D. For player f to choose D along the equi-
librium path it must be that dfk(hz+) > 0 for some k ∈Nf . Since z > T(h), by definition
it must be that dkf (hz+)= 0 and, thus, for π ′ ∈ Pik,
Eπ′(h
z+)=Eπ(hz+)+ efk(hz+)= efk(hz+) > 0
which contradicts that i ∈ S(hz+). Hence, (A) must hold.
For the proof of (B), take j ∈Ni such that i ∈ S(hz+) and j /∈ S(hz+) for z > T(h). Notice
that such a player i must exist by (iv) of Lemma 2. By (A), dij(h
z+z′+ ) = 0 for any z′ ≥ 0.
Since
dji(h
z+z′+1+ )=max{dji(hz+z
′
+ )− 10}
for any z′ ≥ 0, it follows that dji(hz+z′+ ) = 0 for any z′ > dji(hz+). The claim follows by
noting that for any history h, if eij(h)= 0 and i ∈ S(h), then j ∈ S(h). 
Proof of Lemma 4. First consider any player j ∈ D(Gh) such that j 	= i. Let
(N(Gj)Gj) denote the component of the graph G \ {ij} to which player j belongs. By
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condition (ii), such a component cannot include player i and players in Ni \ {j} or else
relationship ij would not be a bridge. We want to establish that djk(h) = 0 for k ∈ Nj ,
where k 	= i. Partition players in the N(Gj) based on their distance from j. In particu-
lar, let Nzj denote the set of players in N(Gj) whose shortest path to player j contains z
relationships and let N0j = {j}. Clearly, N1j =Nj \ {i}.
By induction on the history length, we first prove that if D(Gh)∩N(Gj)= {j}, then
for any distance z ≥ 0, any player r ∈Nzj , and any relationship rk ∈Gj ,
drk(h)=
{
0 if k ∈Nr \Nz−1j
bz(h) if k ∈Nz−1j ,
(2)
where the second condition holds only for z > 0, and bz(h) depends only on z and h,
and is independent of the identity of the two players. Observe that the claim holds for
the empty history, as drk(∅) = 0 for any rk ∈ Gj . Further observe that for m ∈ Nzj and
z > 0, Nm ⊂Nz−1j ∪Nzj ∪Nz+1j and Nm ∩Nz−1j 	=∅. Now assume that the claim holds for
any history of length up to T . We show that it holds for length T + 1. Let (hT a) denote
a history of length T + 1, where a denotes the profile of actions chosen in period T + 1.
Observe that for any distance z > 0 and any player r ∈Nzj ,
ar =D ⇔ drk(hT ) > 0 for k ∈Nz−1j  (3)
since r /∈ D(GhT ) and since, by the induction hypothesis, drk(hT ) = 0 for any k ∈ Nr \
Nz−1j . Thus, for any z > 0, all players in N
z
j must choose the same action since drk(h
T )=
bz(h
T ) for any r ∈Nzi and k ∈Nz−1j ∩Nr , and since Nz−1j ∩Nr 	=∅ given that a path exists
that connects player r to player j (r belongs to component Gj). Thus, for any distance
z > 0, any player r ∈Nzj , and any relationship rk ∈Gj ,
drk(h
T a)= 0 if k ∈Nzi
since drk(hT ) = dkr(hT ) = 0 and since ar = ak. Similarly, observe that for any distance
z ≥ 0, any player r ∈Nzj , and any relationship rk ∈G,
drk(h
T a)= 0 if k ∈Nz+1j 
since drk(hT ) = 0 if k ∈ Nz+1j and because (3) immediately implies that drk(hT a) = 0,
by the transition rules. Finally note that for any distance z > 0, any player r ∈ Nzj , and
any relationship rk ∈G,
drk(h
T a)= bz(hT a) if k ∈Nz−1j 
since drk(hT )= bz(hT ) if k ∈Nz−1j and because al = am for any two players lm ∈Nsj for
any s ≥ 0. Thus, condition (2), must hold for a history of arbitrary length in which only
player j has deviated in component Gj . This establishes that for any history h ∈ H, if
conditions (i) and (ii) in the lemma hold, then djk(h) = 0 for any j ∈ D(Gh) \ {i} and
any one of his neighbors k ∈Nj \ {i}.
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To conclude the proof, consider the neighbors of player i in Ni \ D(Gh). In par-
ticular, consider the component of the network G to which player i belongs when all
the relationships between player i and players in D(Gh) are removed from the net-
work G. Label such a network (N(Gi)Gi). Clearly, Ni \D(Gh)⊂N(Gi). Furthermore,
N(Gi) ∩ D(Gh) = {i} by construction. Hence, since by condition (ii) in the lemma
N(Gi) ∩ Gj = ∅ for any j ∈ D(Gh) \ {i}, the previous induction argument can still be
used to establish that for any distance z ≥ 0, any player r ∈ Nzi , and any relationship
rk ∈Gi,
drk(h)=
{
0 if k ∈Nr \Nz−1i
bz(h) if k ∈Nz−1i ,
where Nzi denotes the set of player at distance z ≥ 0 from i in Gi, as in the previous part
of the proof. Therefore, djk(h)= 0, for any j ∈Ni \D(Gh) and any one of his neighbors
k ∈Nj \ {i}, which, with the previous part of the argument, establishes the result. 
Proving Lemma 5 We begin with a preliminary result. For any history h ∈H, let ht de-
note the subhistory of length t < T . The next lemma relates the sets of defecting players
D(G∗i  h∗(hi) t) and D(Gh t) for two nodes (G∗i  h∗(hi)) ∈ I(hi) and (Gh) ∈ I(hi).
Lemma 10. Consider a node (Gh) ∈ I(hi), where history h is of length T . If
(i) D(G∗i  h∗(hi) t)=D(Gh t) for any t < T and
(ii) Nj = {i} for any j ∈D(GhT−1) \ {i},
then D(G∗i  h∗(hi)T)⊆D(GhT).
Proof. Suppose that the (i) and (ii) hold. Observe that by definition of h∗(hi),
D(G∗i  h∗(hi) t)⊆Ni ∪ {i}
Moreover, note that Lemma 4 can be applied to establish that for any subhistory ht of
length t < T and for any player j ∈Ni,
djk(h
t)= 0 for k ∈Nj \ {i}
Now observe that since (G∗i  h
∗(hi)), (Gh) ∈ I(hi), we must have that for any subhistory
ht of length t < T and for any player j ∈Ni,
dji(h
t)= dji(h∗(hi)t) and dij(ht)= dij(h∗(hi)t)
The latter observation immediately implies that if i ∈ D(G∗i  h∗(hi)T), then i ∈
D(GhT). Now consider a player j ∈ D(G∗i  h∗(hi)T) \ {i}. If player j plays C at T ,
then dji(h∗(hi)T−1) > 0 and, thus, j ∈ D(GhT), since dji(hT−1) > 0 as well. If player j
plays D at T , then dji(h∗(hi)T−1) = 0 and, thus, j ∈ D(GhT), since djk(hT−1) = 0 for
k ∈Nj . 
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We now turn to the proof of Lemma 5.
Proof of Lemma 5. For any player i, consider trembles that satisfy the following
requirements:
(i) If ni = 1, a deviation in period t from ξN occurs with probability εαt , where
(α/(1− α))n < 1.
(ii) If ni > 1, a deviation in period t from ξN occurs with probability ε2.
Note that for any t > 1, such trembles imply that as ε vanishes, a single deviation of
type (i) at time t < T is infinitely less likely than deviations of type (i) by all the players
in periods t + 1 t + 2    T since αt > n∑∞s=t+1 αs. Given the sequence of completely
mixed behavior strategy profiles ξεN obtained by adding the above trembles to the profile
ξN , let θε(Gh) be the probability of node (Gh). The strategy ξεN is such that for every
information set I(hi) of player i, the conditional belief of node (Gh) ∈ I(hi),
βε(Gh|hi)= θ
ε(Gh)∑
(G′h′)∈I(hi) θ
ε(G′h′)

converges as ε→ 0, since each θε(Gh) is a polynomial of the form
x
W∏
k=1
(1− εyk)
V∏
k=1
εzk (4)
for some parameters WV ≤ nT , x ∈ (01), and yk zk ∈ R+ for k in the appropriate
range. For any node (Gh) ∈ I(hi), define
β(Gh|hi)= lim
ε→0
βε(Gh|hi)
We first establish part (a) of the lemma. Consider (Gh) ∈ I(hi). Recall that the history
h∗(hi) is such that (G∗i  h
∗(hi)) ∈ I(hi) and every player j /∈ Ni ∪ {i} plays C in every
period. Obviously, for any j ∈Ni,
hi(j)= h∗(hi j)= h(j)
where hi(j), h∗(hi j), and h(j) denote player j’s play in histories hi, h∗(hi), and h.
Now consider a player j ∈Ni who i-deviates from ξN at the observed history hi. That
is, j ∈D(G∗i  h∗(hi)). Since at node (G∗i  h∗(hi)) all deviations are of type (i),
θε(G∗i  h
∗(hi))≥ f (G∗i )(1− ε)nT ε
where the lower bound is obtained by setting W to be equal to nT and yk = 1 in (4), and
noting that
V∑
k=1
zk ≤
T∑
t=1
nαt < 1
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since (α/(1− α))n < 1. Thus, for ε sufficiently close to zero, there exists a constant q > 0
such that
θε(G∗i  h
∗(hi))≥ qε
The constant q is positive since, by hypothesis, f (G∗i ) > 0.
Now consider a node (G′h′) ∈ I(hi) such that N ′j 	= {i}, where N ′j is the neighbor-
hood of player j in G′. Consider two separate cases:
1. First suppose that j ∈D(G′h′). As the deviation of player j at period t is of type (ii),
θε(G′h′)≤ ε2. Thus,
βε(G′h′|hi)≤ θ
ε(G′h′)
θε(G∗i  h∗(hi))
≤ ε
q

which implies that β(G′h′|hi)= 0. Thus, the claim holds.
2. Then suppose that j /∈D(G′h′). Let t∗ denote the earliest period t in which
D(G∗i  h∗(hi) t) 	=D(G′h′ t)
By the previous argument, we can assume that if r ∈ D(G′h′) ∩Ni, then N ′r = {i},
as otherwise the node would have a null probability. Lemma 10 then yields
D(G∗i  h∗(hi) t∗)⊆D(G′h′ t∗)
which implies that
D(G∗i  h∗(hi) t∗)⊂D(G′h′ t∗)
For any t ≤ T , let K(t) denote the number of player in D(G′h′ t). Then
θε(G′h′)≤ ε
∑t∗
t=1K(t)αt
θε(G∗i  h
∗(hi))≥ f (G∗i )(1− ε)nT ε−(1−n(α/(1−α)))α
t∗+∑t∗t=1K(t)αt 
where the upper bound in the first inequality is obtained by setting yk = ∞, k =
1    W , and x= 1 in (4), and the lower bound in the second inequality is obtained
by setting W = nT and yk = 1 in (4), and noting that
V∑
k=1
zk ≤
t∗−1∑
t=1
K(t)αt + (K(t∗)− 1)αt∗ +
∞∑
t=t∗+1
nαt
Hence, for some constant q′ > 0, when ε is close to zero,
θε(G∗i  h
∗(hi))≥ q′ε−(1−n(α/(1−α)))αt
∗+∑t∗−1t=1 K(t)αt 
Then
βε(G′h′|hi)≤ θ
ε(G′h′)
θε(G∗i  h∗(hi))
≤ ε
(1−n(α/(1−α)))αt∗
q′
and, thus, β(G′h′|hi)= 0 since (α/(1− α))n < 1.
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This establishes part (a) and implies that if β(Gh|hi) > 0, player i believes that
D(Gh)⊆Ni ∪ {i}.
To prove part (b), observe that (a) implies that we can restrict attention to networks
G such that Nj = {i} for any j ∈D(G∗i  h∗(hi)) \ {i}. We prove the claim by contradiction.
Let t∗ be the earliest period t such that
D(G∗i  h∗(hi) t) 	=D(Gh t)
Observe that the same argument as in (a) shows that
D(G∗i  h∗(hi) t∗)⊂D(Gh t∗)
and the claim is proved analogously. 
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